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In early December, President Trump brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. He promised an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Not long after, however, a completely opposite strategy for instability emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, striking sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President warned, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Shift in Policy

These divergent actions encapsulates the central feature of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a stepping back from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on economic deals and ending wars—even as this squares with the emerging military strikes in Nigeria is an open question.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a top U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson echoed this, commenting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This change is significant, but analysts note it is early to assess its effects. The approach is complicated by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented a scholar for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis predicts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Disinterest and Tensions

In contrast to his predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major feud has erupted with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Conditional Involvement

An analogous standoff appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the forceful rhetoric may have spurred the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

Similar to Competitors

Experts see the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.